Notebook
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NEW CENTER PERSONNEL

In July of this year, Benjamin R. Schuster assumed the position of Project Director at the Center for the Study of Federalism. A long time associate of the Center, Mr. Schuster will also serve in the capacities of the Coordinator of the Conference for Federal Studies, Associate Editor of PUBLIUS, and the Editor of the CFS NOTEBOOK. Mr. Schuster is completing his doctoral dissertation which is a study of the relationship between economic and political power in Rockford, Illinois; Davenport, Iowa; and Duluth, Minnesota. From 1973 to 1976, he taught full-time in the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the State University of New York at Albany. Mr. Schuster is anxious to hear from Conference members with inquiries and suggestions about the Center and its activities and with announcements of research and publications for future issues of the NOTEBOOK.

VISITING FACULTY ASSOCIATES

During the spring and summer of 1976, the Center's first Visiting Faculty Associate was in residence. He was Professor Alexandre Marc, emeritus director of the International Center for Federal Studies in Nice, France. A distinguished leader in the movement for European federalism, Professor Marc spent five months at the Center studying American federalism. Among other accomplishments, the Center utilized his visit to lay the groundwork for the creation of an International Association of Institutes of Federalism within the framework of the Conference for Federal Studies.

In September of this year, the second Visiting Faculty Associate arrived at the Center. He is Professor Vukan Kuic of the University of South Carolina and he will be in residence at the Center during the entire fall semester of 1976. Professor Kuic is a specialist in American political thought and the political theory of federalism as well as a major translator of the French political philosopher Ives Simon. During his stay at the Center, Professor Kuic will be working on several articles and a major book which is nearing completion entitled The Silences of the Constitutions.

THE STATE POLITICAL CULTURE PROJECT: COUNTY TYPOGRAPHIES

In July, the Center took the first steps toward mapping the political culture of every county in the United States using both qualitative and quantitative indicators. The immediate goal is to develop an archive and permanent data bank for selecting specific counties and localities for more intensive field study work. In two days of meetings at the Center with Dr. Robert Savage of the University of Arkansas and a corresponding faculty associate of the Center, the preliminary procedures and time-table for the project were drafted. Dr. Savage developed the pilot for this project through a case study of Arkansas which will be published in PUBLIUS in 1976-77. Anyone interested in more information about this project should contact Ben Schuster at the Center. Since the project is still in a very early stage of operation, we would appreciate any useful suggestions and comments from all interested individuals.

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RESEARCH NOTE

Federalism in the Strategy of Presidential Campaign Trails, 1932-1972: An Empirical Analysis

by Raymond Tatalovich

The president is a national political leader, but his election depends on a federal rather than on a truly national constituency. Such is the impact of the Electoral College, which awards its votes to the presidential candidate who wins at least a plurality of the popular votes in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. Given this winner-take-all bias, it is argued that presidential candidates have a strong incentive to devote their time, energy, and policy appeals to specific states in the Union. That is, they must be particularly attentive to the large states, for it can be shown that a small number of large states controls a majority of the electoral votes needed for a president's election. It is also argued that the candidates will concentrate on two-party competitive states rather than on those states considered safely one-party for either the Republicans or the Democrats. It may be assumed that the large states are also two-party competitive, but the degree of competition in any state may vary from election to election. At any rate, these arguments are commonplace throughout the major textbooks in political science.[1] They are also upheld by observers of presidential politics.[2]

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[1] For example see the following: James MacGregor Burns and J.W. Peltason, Government by the People, 8th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 285; Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and David Wise, Democracy Under Pressure: An Introduction to the American Political System (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 357; Martin Diamond, et al., The Democratic Republic: An Introduction to American National Government, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand-McNally and Co., 1971), p. 436; Marian D. Irish and James W. Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 405; V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964), p. 466; Kenneth Prewitt and Sidney Verba, An Introduction to American Politics (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1974), pp. 302-303; Emmette S. Redford, et al., Politics and Government in the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), p. 287.

[2] Dorothy Buckton James, The Contemporary Presidency (New York:

The operation of the aforementioned variables can lead to a geographical bias in the operation of the Electoral College, though this fact is less explicitly stated by most scholars. It is plausible that the South, for example, would be deemphasized by both parties since that region has been solidly Democratic for so many years. Other regions too may be affected since the distribution of large, two-party states is not random throughout the nation. Therefore, this analysis will evaluate presidential campaign trails in terms of all three variables--the size, competitiveness, and geographical location of forty-eight states within the continental United States.

One empirical calculation of the Electoral College bias on presidential campaigns was undertaken of the 1960 election by Stanley Kelley, Jr.[3] His analysis gives credence to the hypotheses relating to size and competition, though clearly one election may prove to be exceptional to yet undiscovered political trends. By examining all presidential elections between 1932 and 1972, this study will more thoroughly indicate the overall validity of those hypotheses for our understanding of American electoral politics.

Professor Kelley utilized basic information on the campaign trails of both Republican and Democratic presidential candidates as outlined in the New York Times, and that source was used for this analysis also. However, he relied upon the published, anticipated schedules of campaign stops by the candidates to extrapolate the amount of time spent by each man in respective states. This research goes beyond that point, by following through with each day's reporting of candidates' activities to determine the location of their campaigns in the states. Specifically, the number of communities (though not necessarily different communities[4]) visited by candidates for campaign

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Pegasus, 1969), pp. 20-21; Louis W. Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), p. 51; Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 260-261.

3 Stanley Kelley's article in The Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-1961, ed. Paul David (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 71.

4 Clarification is needed at this point. If a candidate in one day makes campaign appearances in this sequence--in Chicago, then in Rockford, then in Springfield, then in Peoria, and then in Chicago, a total of five campaign "stops" would be recorded for the state of Illinois. Candidates do revisit important cities

purposes--formal speeches, informal talks from trains and motorcades, appearances at ceremonies, and the like--was determined. In conducting this research, it became apparent that candidates of both parties do alter, at times significantly, their first-published schedules. Moreover, a candidate may spend a whole day in one city, for example Chicago, or those many hours covering a dozen communities within the state of Illinois. The use of campaign "stops" is based on the judgement that the candidates' commitment to actively reach the electorate throughout those states perceived to be important to their campaigns would be better indexed by the number of such communities visited, and revisited, during the period between Labor Day and Election Day. Finally, presidential candidates do maintain their headquarters in major cities, such as New York City, so while they may spend much time logged within, in this example, New York State, it may not reflect their active campaigning.

It should be noted that where the news account provided in the New York Times inadequately reported the candidates' daily campaign events, further inquiry was made in the regional newspaper covering the geographical area in question. In most instances, however, the New York Times information appeared to be comprehensive and complete, though one can never be perfectly certain when working with such data. In this light, Professor Kelley's acknowledgement that his analysis would be taken as an approximate index to presidential campaigning can be accepted equally as a caveat to this undertaking.

The use of "time" or campaign "stops" appear to be valid indicators for evaluating the hypotheses offered. Professor Kelley determined for the 1960 election that Kennedy devoted about 57 percent of his time to the seven largest doubtful states and that Nixon allocated about 51 percent of his time to those same states. My results for that election are comparable to his,

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many times during their campaigns, and this index to campaigning would be highly inaccurate if only the different communities visited were included in its makeup. This calculation is not affected, however, by the number of appearances a candidate makes within each of the communities listed in the example above. News reporting is not precise enough to enable one to determine every instance of campaigning; moreover, the difficulties involved in trying to evaluate specific events as campaign incidents would be enormous. The index devised for this analysis, therefore, can be derived from available newspaper sources and can be operationally defined for research purposes.

though there are differences in our categorization of the states.[5] Finally, the period between Labor Day and Election Day can vary in length, but in this analysis comparisons between candidates or between elections are not made on the basis of "absolute" frequencies. What is compared is the relative importance of given states to the campaign strategies of each party's presidential candidates in eleven elections.

Table 1 shows the proportion of campaign stops made by Republican presidential candidates in states classified according to their number of electoral votes. Table 2 provides comparable data for the Democrats. The small N's in selected years for both the Republicans (1956, 1972) and the Democrats (1940, 1944) indicate only that their candidates--in all cases incumbent presidents--did not actively campaign. However, the actual number of campaign appearances made within each group of communities would be the N multiplied many times. Important conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of Table 1 and Table 2.

The seven states with 21 or more electoral votes dominate both parties' campaign strategies. The proportion of campaign stops is highest in this particular size category in 10 elections for the Republicans and in every election for the Democrats. However, the proportion of campaign stops in the category of 3-4 electoral votes is lowest in only three elections for the Republicans and in only four elections for the Democrats. This comparison of the extremes of the distributions shows that, though both parties are drawn toward the largest seven states in their campaigning, such emphasis is not made at the direct expense of the smallest states in the Electoral College.

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5 In his analysis, the seven largest doubtful states were New Jersey, Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, Texas, Michigan, and New York. In my size classification (Tables 1 and 2), all those states are included in the category of 21+ electoral votes except New Jersey, for which Ohio is substituted. That modification, however, may explain why my analysis of the 1960 election indicates higher percentages of campaign activities--though the difference between Kennedy and Nixon is approximate to Professor Kelley's. As shown in Table 1 and Table 2, Kennedy allocated 65.1 percent and Nixon allocated 60.4 percent of their campaign stops to the largest seven states. It should be noted, also, that Professor Kelley designated a "doubtful" state as one in which the winning candidate was not more than 6 percent ahead of his opponent; that criteria is also used in this analysis.

TABLE 1

Campaign Stops by Republican Presidential Candidates
in States Classified According to Their Number
of Electoral Votes During the Elections of 1932 to 1972

Year	N	Number of Electoral Votes in State[a]				
		3-4	5-7	8-10	11-17	21+
1932	106	6.6%	18.9%	9.4%	17.0%	48.1%
1936	131	9.2	5.3	22.9	33.6	31.3
1940	242	9.1	5.4	19.4	19.8	46.3
1944	51	7.8	7.8	21.6	17.7	45.1
1948	100	19.0	19.0	14.0	17.0	31.0
1952	209	6.2	7.7	23.9	24.3	38.8
1956	20	0.0	10.0	30.0	15.0	45.0
1960	182	6.0	5.0	12.1	16.5	60.4
1964	86	12.8	9.3	15.1	19.8	43.0
1968	118	3.4	.9	11.0	18.6	66.1
1972	25	8.0	4.0	12.0	8.0	68.0

[a] The number of states in each size category follows: 3-4 (13), 5-7 (8), 8-10 (11), 11-17 (9), 21+ (7). Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from this table, and from all tables to follow. Each state retained the same rank in terms of its electoral vote size for every election studied.

TABLE 2

Campaign Stops by Democratic Presidential Candidates in States Classified According to Their Number of Electoral Votes During the Elections of 1932 to 1972

Year	N	Number of Electoral Votes in State[a]				
		3-4	5-7	8-10	11-17	21+
1932	98	15.3%	13.3%	8.2%	27.6%	35.7%
1936	77	3.9	15.6	15.6	13.0	52.0
1940	36	2.8	2.8	22.2	11.1	61.1
1944	16	6.3	6.3	12.5	25.0	50.0
1948	169	4.7	7.7	17.2	23.7	46.8
1952	154	5.2	3.3	18.2	21.4	52.0
1956	102	3.9	4.9	15.7	20.6	54.9
1960	249	4.8	3.6	10.0	16.5	65.1
1964	97	12.4	6.2	12.4	18.6	50.5
1968	96	4.2	5.2	12.5	12.5	65.6
1972	120	4.2	3.3	12.5	12.5	67.5

[a] The number of states in each size category is indicated in the footnote to Table 1.

In light of that finding, it is clear that the parties' tendency to campaign in larger states is not perfectly correlated across the five size categories. To illustrate, the proportion of campaign stops in states of 8-10, of 11-17, and of 21+ electoral votes becomes progressively higher in seven (of eleven) elections for both Republicans and Democrats.[6] The importance of the largest seven states in the Electoral College to both parties, therefore, does not imply that their candidates are bound simply by the variable of size as they plan strategy to affect the remaining states in the Union.

However, it also appears that the Democrats concentrate on the seven largest states somewhat more heavily than do the Republicans. In fact, the size variable differentiates between the two parties' campaign strategies. By comparing the percent of campaign stops by Republicans and by Democrats in each size category, it can be determined which party gives higher priority to each category of states over eleven elections. The Republicans have higher percentages in states with 3-4 electoral votes (for 8 elections), in states with 5-7 electoral votes (for 8 elections), in states with 8-10 electoral votes (for 7 elections), and in states with 11-17 electoral votes (for 6 elections). In states with 21 or more electoral votes, however, the GOP allocates proportionately more campaign stops than the Democrats in only three of eleven elections. Therefore, over 11 elections the GOP most often gives higher priority than the Democrats to states with 3-4 and 5-7 electoral votes; in contrast, the Democrats typically give more attention than the Republicans to those states with 21+ electoral votes.

Textbook discussion of the largest states typically links them to the concept of marginality. Either those states are by nature two-party competitive or they are included in that grouping of states considered unsafe for either political party. This variable is analyzed separately in Table 3. Any state in which the Republican and Democratic candidates are separated by no more than six percent of the popular vote cast is coded as as "marginal." This measure is based on the final vote result, but it is used on the assumption that such an ultimate election

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[6]Similarly, in comparing the proportions in the categories of 3-4 and 5-7 electoral votes, the percentage of campaign stops is higher in the latter category for 3 of 11 elections for the Republicans and for 4 of 11 elections for the Democrats. The percentages of campaign stops become progressively higher across all five size categories in only one election for the Republicans (1952) and in only two elections for the Democrats (1948, 1956).

TABLE 3

Campaign Stops by Republican and Democratic Presidential Candidates in Marginal[a] States During the Elections of 1932 and 1972

Year	Rank[b]	Republican Campaign Stops		Democratic Campaign Stops	
		N	% in Marginal States	N	% in Marginal States
1932	8	106	38.7	98	14.3
1936	11	131	2.3	77	0.0
1940	5	242	51.7	36	50.0
1944	4	51	72.6	16	87.5
1948	3	100	56.0	169	66.3
1952	6	209	7.7	154	14.9
1956	7	20	0.0	102	2.9
1960	1	182	72.5	249	75.9
1964	9	86	4.7	97	10.3
1968	2	118	70.3	96	78.8
1972	10	25	4.0	120	2.5

[a]A marginal state is one in which the popular vote was divided between the Republican and Democratic candidates by the margin of six percentage points or less.

[b]The rank is based on the competitiveness of the election in terms of the percentage of the national popular vote going to the Republican and Democratic candidates. The elections are ranked from most competitive (1) to least competitive (11) on the basis of that criteria.

TABLE 4

Campaign Stops by Republican Presidential Candidates
States Classified According to Region
During the Elections of 1932 to 1972

Year	N	Northeast[a]	Midwest[b]	South[c]	West[d]
1932	106	14.2%	55.7%	17.0%	13.2%
1936	131	19.1	59.5	15.3	6.1
1940	242	35.5	35.1	8.7	20.7
1944	51	37.3	17.7	21.6	23.5
1948	100	27.0	17.0	12.0	44.0
1952	209	26.3	35.4	18.7	19.1
1956	20	30.0	25.0	20.0	25.0
1960	182	34.1	36.3	14.3	15.4
1964	86	25.6	14.0	37.2	23.3
1968	118	34.8	28.0	22.9	14.4
1972	25	32.0	20.0	28.0	20.0

[a]The states included in this region are: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Rhode Island.

[b]The states included in this region are: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

[c]The states included in this region are: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

[d]The states included in this region are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

TABLE 5

Campaign Stops by Democratic Presidential Candidates
in States Classified According to Region
During the Elections of 1932 to 1972

Year	N	Northeast[a]	Midwest	South	West
1932	98	34.7%	15.3%	20.4%	29.6%
1936	77	49.4	32.5	13.0	5.2
1940	36	69.4	13.9	16.7	0.0
1944	16	75.0	12.5	12.5	0.0
1948	169	21.2	38.5	23.7	16.0
1952	154	46.1	29.2	11.0	13.6
1956	102	42.2	26.5	13.7	17.6
1960	249	32.9	32.9	17.7	16.5
1964	97	8.3	46.4	20.6	24.7
1968	96	40.6	18.8	24.0	16.7
1972	120	36.7	31.7	13.3	18.3

[a]The states within each of the four regions are indicated in the footnotes of Table 4.

outcome would probably be seen in the making by both parties as they plan campaign strategy. Certainly in the later elections studied, the availability of precise public opinion polls would permit a determination of what states looked doubtful to either of the parties' candidates.

At first glance, it seems that the parties' efforts in marginal states is very uneven, but this circumstance is a reflection of the competitiveness of the presidential election. That is, when the contest between Republicans and Democrats is not very competitive (1932, 1936, 1952, 1956, 1964, and 1972), the number of marginal states is too small to occupy all the attention of either party's candidate. On the other hand, when the presidential election is highly competitive, it is reflected in many states where both parties concentrate their campaign stops. In 1940, 1944, 1948, 1960, and 1968 both parties' candidates devoted at least half (and typically more) of their campaign stops in marginal states. The eleven elections are ranked in Table 3 from most to least competitive, based on the national popular vote for Republicans and Democrats. The elections in which both parties' candidates concentrate on marginal states rank 1-5; those elections in which neither candidate concentrates on marginal states rank 6-11. Therefore, the importance of marginality as a strategic factor depends upon competition in presidential elections.

In contrast, the degree of competition between Republicans and Democrats has little effect on the commitment of both parties to campaign in the largest seven states. That is, both parties allocate most campaign stops to those states even when the contest is less than competitive. Increased competition, however, does have the effect of encouraging both candidates to give even more attention to the seven largest states. The elections of 1960, 1968, 1948, 1944, and 1940 rank 1-5 in competitiveness. The data (Table 1 and Table 2) indicate that these five elections account for the five highest percentages of campaign stops by both Republicans and Democrats in states with 21+ electoral votes. So size <u>and</u> marginality together make the seven largest states critical to both parties' campaigns; size alone operates as a variable of secondary importance; and marginality alone is weakest in impact. In this light, it does appear that the largest seven states are pivotal to the operation of the Electoral College and to the presidential candidates' strategy for victory.

It is hypothesized that the variables of size and marginality should affect the geographical distribution of the candidates' campaign stops. The proportions of campaign stops within four broad regions of the nation are given in Table 4 for Republicans and in Table 5 for the Democrats.

By ranking the regions 1-4 for each election in terms of the percentage of campaign stops devoted to each, an average ranking for all 11 elections would indicate the importance of each region to each political party. This procedure was undertaken, with these results. Both Republicans and Democrats give first and second priority to, respectively, the Northeast and the Midwest. Less important and clustered more closely together are the West and the South for the Republicans, but the South ranks third and the West fourth for the Democrats.[7] The importance of the Northeast and the Midwest to both parties no doubt reflects the fact that the larger, two-party states are found in those regions. In contrast, the greater importance of the South than the West to the Democrats may reflect that party's traditional dominance in the states below the Mason-Dixon. The slight tendency of Republicans to campaign in the West rather than in the South, consequently, may relate to the GOP's greater success in the states which compose the West.

It has been noted that Democrats tend to increase their campaign commitment in the largest states whereas the Republicans tend to devote more attention to smaller states. To what extent, therefore, may regions differentiate between the two parties' campaign strategies? By comparing the proportion of campaign stops in each region by Republicans (Table 4) and by Democrats (Table 5) for eleven elections, one can determine that the Republicans devote proportionately more stops than the Democrats to the Midwest (in 7 elections), the West (in 6 elections), and the South (in 6 elections). But the GOP gives higher priority to the Northeast than do Democrats in only 3 of 11 elections. So the Republicans favor Midwest to a greater extent whereas the Democrats focus more attention on the Northeast. The parties split more evenly in the West and the South, though the GOP holds a slight edge in both regions.

Given the Democratic hegemony in the South, finally, it may be assumed that both parties devote more campaign stops to the "Border" states within that region, where two-party competition is more viable. Table 6 gives the percentage of campaign stops in six "Border" states of the South. Prior to 1952, the GOP centered virtually all its campaign stops in these states, and the Democrats also followed that tendency, though to a lesser degree. Since 1952, however, both parties shifted their attention away from the Border states to the

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[7]The average ranking of the regions for the Republicans is as follows: Northeast-1.55; Midwest-2.27; West-3.00; South-3.18. For the Democrats they are, respectively: 1.50; 2.18; 2.95; 3.36.

TABLE 6

Campaign Stops by Republican and Democratic Presidential Candidates in the "Border" States of the Southern Region[a]

Year	N[b]	Republicans	N[b]	Democrats
1932	18	100.0%	20	30.0%
1936	20	90.0	10	70.0
1940	21	95.2	6	66.7
1944	11	100.0	2	100.0
1948	12	100.0	40	65.0
1952	39	43.6	17	41.2
1956	4	25.0	14	71.4
1960	26	34.6	44	36.4
1964	32	31.2	20	25.0
1968	27	14.8	23	39.1
1972	7	57.1	16	43.7

[a]According to my classification in footnote "c" to Table 4, the states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia would be considered "Border" states.

[b]For each year the N is the number of campaign stops by each party's candidate in the Southern region of seventeen states. The percentage indicated, therefore, is the proportion of campaign stops of the total (N) in "Border: states only.

states of the former Confederacy. In fact, the highest proportion of campaign stops in non-Border states was made by Richard Nixon in 1968 rather than by Barry Goldwater in 1964, as one might expect. While one cannot draw inferences beyond the scope of the data at hand, it does appear that neither party's candidates for President today perceive the Deep South as "Solid" and therefore immune to direct, personal campaign appeals from Republican standard-bearers. Certainly such organizational commitment by the GOP, and its presidential candidates, is consistent with any long-range objective to make that region two-party in competition.

To summarize, this analysis verfiies the major hypotheses about the effect of the Electoral College on presidential candidates' choice of states in which to campaign for election. Both parties allocate more campaign stops to the seven largest states, and this predisposition is upheld regardless of the competitiveness of the election outcome. When the presidential election is competitive, candidates of both parties also focus on "marginal" states, but this variable loses all significance when an apparent landslide victory by either party's candidate is in the making. Both Republicans and Democrats rank the Northeast and the Midwest as more important in their campaign strategies than the West or the South.

However, when the two parties are compared over eleven elections, it is found that the Republicans tend to emphasize the Midwest whereas the Democrats focus more attention on the Northeast. Also, the Democrats concentrate their campaign stops in the largest seven states, but the GOP gives more attention to smaller states in the Union. Given the fact that the Democrats won seven of the elections studied, one can only speculate whether this latter aspect of GOP campaign strategy undermined the efficacy of its electoral appeals, particularly in the era before widespread television coverage of presidential campaigns.

Thus, the Electoral College has impact on the campaign trails of our major parties' presidential candidates. Should this system be replaced with direct popular election of the President, it would be instructive to determine whether these biases of federalism carry over, or are undermined, by a truly national system of presidential election.